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SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE RIGHTS
OF NATIVE AMERICANS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOHN HOWARD CLINEBELL*
JIM THOMSON"
INTRODUCTION
Native Americans have stressed for many years that they are
sovereign peoples who were originally and now should be recognized
as independent, self-governing nations. That plea today falls on deaf
ears in the United States. Indians are therefore turning to the inter-
national community and asking the nations of the world to recognize
the right of Native Americans to be judged by the same standards as
other countries.' The purpose of this article is to consider the proper
status of Native Americans under international law. Part I will analyze
the legal principle of sovereignty. The first step in that section will
be to measure Indian -tribes, both before the European invasion and
in 1979, against the international law definition of a state. Since there
are many different types of states, ranging from totally dependent to
fully independent, the second step will be to investigate the degree
of independence enjoyed by Native Americans at the time of the
European arrival. Then we will discuss several justifications which
have been offered for denying Native Americans their prior legal
status, and test those arguments against basic standards of international
law.
Even if some or all native nations have the right, the ability, and
the desire to enjoy their full sovereign independent status, others may
not have that right, may not wish to exercise it, or may wish to work
toward it gradually. It is therefore important to discuss a second
principle of international law, the right to self-determination. If that
principle is applicable, it will allow each eligible native group to choose
the relationship its government will have with other nations, whether
* Attorney for the Puyallup Tribe of Indians; J.D. 1974, University of California,
Davis.
** J.D. 1976, Western State University.
1. See, e.g., D. SANDERS, THE FORMATION OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (1977); Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations
and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 10, no. 3, at 16 (1978);
The First International Conference of Indigenous Peoples Meet at Tseshaht B.C.,
Akwesasne Notes, vol. 7, no. 5, at 34 (1975).
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complete sovereign independence, total dependence, or something in
between. We will examine that principle in Part II by describing its
history, measuring its current status, then testing its applicability to
Native Americans.
Both sovereignty and self-determination are imprecise concepts
in international law. Part III will therefore synthesize the two dis-
cussions and suggest an interrelation, particularly in their application
to Native Americans.
A dichotomy that affects this subject is the deviation between
theory and practice of international law. The practice of states, which
is one source of international law, often does not conform to the theory
of international law, and does not respect some of its principles and
rules. However, if nations had allowed that problem to deter their
attempts to develop, improve and implement standards of interna-
tional law, they would have given up long ago. The emphasis in the
world community is on establishing more exact and uniform prin-
ciples of law through covenants, treaties, declarations, and the United
Nations Charter and resulting documents, rather than relying on
vaguely defined notions of the practice of states. The approach in this
article will be to analyze the accepted written sources of international
law.2
For example, the United States has, by means of superior num-
bers, technology and weaponry, assumed a great deal of control over
the lives, property and rights of Indian people and governments. This
fettered relationship is very similar to the colonial empires estab-
lished in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries by European nations and
later by the United States.8 Those imperial powers established colonies
on other continents to exploit the natural resources, acquire vast land
holdings and utilize indigenous people as cheap labor to achieve
their commercial ends.4 The United States has, by threat and use of
force, imposed its laws on native people,5 removed and exploited
natural resources on native lands,6 suppressed native religions and
2. See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1966).
3. See The Navajo Nation: Cultivating Underdevelopment, Akwesasne Notes, vol.
10, no. 4, at 7 (1978); The Global Supermarket, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 10, no. 2, at
19 (1978); The Effects of Colonialism on Indian Life, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 6, no. 4,
at 40 (1974).
4. M. BROWN, ECONOMICS OF IMPERIALISM (1974); Ryan, Indian Nations Com-
pared to Other Nations, Am. Indian J., vol. 3, no. 8, at 2 (1977).
5. See notes 10 & 11 infra.
6. Resource Exploitation: The Cutting Edge of Genocide, Akwesasne Notes, vol.
10, no. 2, at 9 (1978).
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culture7 and restricted native peoples' control of their external affairs
and certain elements of their internal affairs.8 In an attempt to justify
that exploitation under its own law and under principles of inter-
national law, the United States government has pieced together an
inconsistent, often contradictory and incoherent patchwork of statutes,
regulations, and policies with which it purports to govern native
people.9 The underlying principle which supports that body of Indian
law is the "plenary power" of the United States over Indian tribes
and people; the United States Congress assumes the authority to enact
and enforce any kind of limitation on native people and their rights
and property which it deems appropriate.' 0 The courts also assume
this authority." Those realities may seem inconsistent with any claim
to sovereignty and self-determination, but what we are analyzing are
the rights of native people under international law. If the United
States is imposing restrictions in violation of international law, the
restrictions do not change the rights which native people are entitled
to exercise under that law.
This article will make repeated references to domestic United States
law. This is not meant to imply 'that the United States is entitled to
exercise any control over Indians or that the body of Indian law
developed by the United States is fair, just or consistent with inter-
national law. Those references show only that under the self-serving
interpretation of international law used by the United States, and
under federal Indian law, with its inherent injustice to Indians, the
conclusions described in this article hold true, just as they do under
accepted standards of international law. Indian people face the same
contradiction when they recognize the injustice of a legal system that
explicitly precludes recognition of native governmental rights, but
are nevertheless forced by practical realities to argue within that system
for protection of -their remaining rights.
Another variable which complicates this subject is the diversity
among Indian tribes. The locations and experiences of Indian tribes
7. The Issue is Not Feathers: Legal Attacks on Native Religious Traditions, Ak-
wesasne Notes, vol. 9, no. 3, at 21 (1977); Interior Department Raids Crack Down on
Native Use of Feathers, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 6, no. 2, at 37 (1974).
8. See notes 145, 242, & 243 infra.
9. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-1675 (1976); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw (Ist ed. 1942).
10. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
11. See Oliphant v. Suquaraish Tribe, 434 U.S. 949 (1978); Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 175 (1977); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977).
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have placed them in vastly differing situations. To realistically apply
principles of international law, -the situation of each tribe should be
investigated individually. Since such a monumental task is beyond
the scope of this article, we have attempted to extract the lowest
common denominator by discussing ,the very basic principles of inter-
national law applicable to groups with certain basic characteristics
that most tribes possess. Those variations suggest another difficulty
confronting native sovereignty and self-determination: the potential
for a number of independent mini-states, few of them large enough
to sustain themselves. But that is not a necessary result. Tribes may
choose any of a variety of forms of government and degrees of inde-
pendence. Further, Indians have the ability and have already begun
to overcome that problem by means of working arrangements with
other governments, both native and non-native, and with private
businesses and organizations. And in any case, those factors do not
change the rights which Indians have under international law.'2
This article makes reference to and requires at least general
familiarity with a number of historical and contemporary facts and
circumstances. It would be impossible to fully narrate or document
those facts in anything shorter than a lengthy history textbook or
series. That is due to the number of Indian tribes, the variety of their
circumstances, the lack of written documentation of much of the
historical and even contemporary material, and the sheer volume of
factual matters that underlie the application of these legal principles
to native peoples. Unfamiliarity with the factual matters necessary to
a discussion of those legal principles, and the lack of a comprehensive
discussion of that material in one place, cannot be allowed to prevent
consideration of the proper status of Native Americans under inter-
national law. That discussion must go forward at the same time
documentation of the needed factual material is occurring.
I. NATIVE AMERICANS AND SOVEREIGNTY
Part I of this article will analyze the concept of sovereignty under
international law as applied to Native Americans. Section A will dis-
cuss whether Native American nations qualify as "states" under inter-
national law, both before the arrival of Europeans in the 15th cen-
12. "[T]he question of territorial size, geographic location and limited resources
should in no way delay the implementation of the Declaration [on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples] with respect to the territories con-
cerned." 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 3429, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
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tury and at the present time. The many types of states under inter-
national law may be divided into two general categories: sovereign
(or independent) and semi-sovereign (dependent). 13 Section B will
analyze which types of states native nations originally were, as recog-
nized by other nations, international law scholars, and United States
courts. Section C will discuss whether any of the various justifications
which have been offered to deny Native Americans their independent
sovereign status are valid under international law.
A. Indicia of Statehood Under International Law
Article I of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States14 notes -the criteria that define a state for the purposes of
international law: a permanent population, a defined territory, an
effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with
other states.15
1. Population. There is no serious dispute that Native American
nations have for centuries had, and still have, permanent populations.16
Indians constitute a separate racial group,17 as well as distinct political
groups under their own laws and federal law s.8 Before the European
invasion they were organized in bands and villages, and to some ex-
tent tribes. The size of the native population has of course varied,
but has always been defined by birth into one of those bands or
groups.'9 Indian population is specifically counted today both by tribe
and as a total. The United States counted not quite 800,000 Native
Americans in its 1970 census.20 One writer has stated that in order
to fulfill the requirement of a permanent population a people must be
sufficient in number to maintain and perpetuate itself.2 ' If Native
Americans can survive and maintain their identity in the face of the
destructive policies of the United States government,2 they certainly
have permanent and durable populations.
13. 1 G. HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1940).
14. Dec. 26, 1933, Inter-American, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100 T.S. No. 881.
15. 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 13, at 47; 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
16-17 (Ist ed. 1922).
16. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
17. W. BODMER & L. CAVALLI-SFoRzA, GENETIcS, EVOLUTION AND MAN (1976).
18. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55, 60 (1978); McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1963); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
19. F. CotEN, supra note 9, at 136.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE, THE FIRST AMERICANS (1973).
21. 1 C. HYDE, supra note 15, at 16-17.
22. See text accompanying notes 101-94 infra.
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2. Territory. Before the European arrival natives had the use of
the entire North American continent and controlled activities within
that territory. There were some territorial divisions; many tribes,
bands and villages had primary or even exclusive use of particular
areas, and those divisions were recognized either through cooperation
and agreement or as a result of disputes and the use of force.2 3 When
the Europeans came to North America, they recognized it as an area
inhabited by the native people.24 Though boundaries were in some
places only vaguely defined, a lack of precise boundaries is not a bar to
statehood under international law; a group may be recognized as a
state even though its frontiers are not certain as long as it controls
an area of land.25
The territory controlled by Native Americans is even more spe-
cifically defined today. Control over most of the land on the continent
has been assumed (though in many cases illegally) 2 by the United
States. But the treaties which transferred most of the land spelled out
various areas which were reserved for the use and control of the tribes.
Typical of the many treaties signed by the United States and Native
Americans is a provision in the treaty with the Sioux, which specified
that "[t]he United States agrees that -the following district [legal de-
scription] shall be and the same is, set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein." 27
In 1976 there were 267 Indian reservations containing over 51
million acres.28 That is a considerably larger area than many countries
of the world. In fact, certain Native American nations are larger than
some states recognized as independent by the international community.
The Navajo Reservation, for example, is larger than forty self-govern-
ing foreign nations.29 The United States Supreme Court has long
recognized -the distinct status of Indians lands and the authority of
Indian tribes and their governments within those lands.8 0 The Indian
Claims Commission, an adjudicative body established by the United
States Congress to pay compensation for land improperly taken from
23. See, e.g., C. WISSLER, INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1966).
24. See D. QUINN, NORTH AMERICA FROMI EARLIEST DISCOVERY TO FIRST SETTLE-
MENT 4-10 (1977).
25. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 67.
26. See text accompanying notes 101-94 infra.
27. Act of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 636.
28. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT REPORT (1976).
29. V. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 166-68 (1974).
30. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 352 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commn, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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Indian tribes, requires, as a precondition to recovery, proof of an
identifiable population and land area.31 The Commission has made
dozens of awards; thus it has recognized that Native Americans meet
those first two requirements of statehood.32
3. Government. The third criterion of statehood is control over
the population and territory, or effective government. A group must
provide a legal order and a stable political community for its social
and political structure.33
Historians and anthropologists have documented in some detail
the social and governmental systems of a number of Indian tribes in
the days before contact with the Europeans.34 Although there existed
a wide variety and diversity of systems, almost all tribes, bands and
villages regulated activities and relations among their members with
one degree of formality or another.3 5 Many tribes had quite formal,
well developed and stable governmental structures and political com-
munities which provided for their governance and social and legal
order.36 Chief Justice John Marshall, the prime architect of federal
Indian law, recognized quite early that Indian tribes were originally
self-governing peoples when he referred to "the character of 'the Chero-
kees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others,
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."37 After hear-
ing testimony from a number of historians, anthropologists and native
elders in United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, federal
district Judge Warren K. Urbom commented: "The Sioux, and un-
doubtedly many other tribes as well, had a highly developed govern-
mental system, a religion proclaiming the sacredness -of all nature and
life, and a disposition toward peacefulness at least as effective as that
of the white intruders."38
31. 25 U.S.C. § 70 a (1976).
32. E.g., Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 284 F.2d 361 (Ct. CI.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1960).
33. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 67.
34. See generally A. DEBo, A HISTORY OF INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES.(1977); P. FARB, MAN's RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE INDIANS OF NORTH7
AMERICA FROM PRImEVAL TIMES TO THE COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE (1968);
D. SNOW, THE ARcHAEOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICA (1976).
35. See P. FARB, supra note 34.
36. See id.; V. DELORIA, supra note 29. See also B. DUTTON, INDIANS OF THE.
SOUTHWEST (1965); J. SWANTON, THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 767, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1946).
37. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
38. 389 F. Supp. 235, 240 (D.S.D. 1975).
1978]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Most tribal governments today are still the structures providing
a political community and governance of the social and legal order
in native society. There are many types of tribal governments: some
have retained or regained a traditional native structure; others are
patterned in the western democratic constitutional mold, as a result
of the United States influence and/or coercion.39 Although many tri-
bal governments suffer from turmoil and do not always represent the
majority, those same problems characterize the governments of a num-
ber of other countries in the world. Whatever their form, tribal gov-
ernments perform the entire range of functions and services expected
of an effective government: law enforcement, administration of jus-
tice, definition and control of tribal membership and exclusion of
non-members, jurisdiction over property and resources, taxation, land
use, control of descent and distribution of property, control of domes-
tic relations and juvenile welfare, provision for health, welfare and
education services, collection and disbursement of funds, and regula-
tion of business activities. 40
The United States recognizes and encourages tribal government, 41
albeit not in the way most conducive to tribal sovereignty.42 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly and consistently recognized the authority
of Indian tribes on reservations. 43
The fact that some governmental functions on Indian reserva-
tions are performed by the United States government does not change
'the conclusion. A state may delegate some of its powers and arrange
to have them provided by another government without losing its
statehood or sovereignty."
4. Capacity to carry on foreign relations. The fourth criterion
which a group must meet to qualify for statehood under international
law is the capacity to enter into foreign relations, to have dealings
with other states.45 The history of native peoples' dealings with Euro-
pean and other foreign states is the best testimony to their capacity
and authority to carry on foreign relations. For centuries Native
39. See text accompanying notes 143 & 242-43 infra.
40. CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND BY-LAws OF INDIAN TRIBES OF NORTH
AmERICA (G. Fay ed. 1967).
41. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976); 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1976); THE AMERicAN
INDIAN-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 363,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
42. See text accompanying notes 244-45 infra.
43. See note 30 supra.
44. See text accompanying notes 158-60 infra.
45. 1 C. HYDE, supra note 15, at 16-17.
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Americans have entered into treaties with the United States and other
countries. 46
Native Americans first signed treaties with Great Britain and
France-nations seeking the aid of the Indians in their continuing
struggle for control of the continent.47 The British colonies, estab-
lished on the eastern coast of North America, entered into a number
of treaties with Indians, and in fact many of the colonies survived be-
cause of protection and assistance from Natives. 48 The United States
later explicitly recognized and mandated observance of the treaties
which Indians had signed with other nations.49 After its independ-
ence, the United States continued to deal with Native Americans
through the execution of some 370 treaties. 50
The subject matter of 'the treaties indicates recognition of the
sovereign status of Native Americans: 5' war and peace, 52 boundary set-
tlements, 53 extradition, 4 passport systems, 55 trade, 56 and relations with
other countries.57 The United States Supreme Court has noted the
import of the treaties and the tribes' capacity for carrying on foreign
relations. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
They have uniformly been treated as a State from the settlement of
our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United
46. S. RoSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 108 (1970).
47. AMERICA'S FRONTIER STORY 126, 182 (R. Billington & M. Ridge eds. 1969);
10 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
(E. O'Callaghan ed. 1858).
48. AMERICA'S FRONTIER STORY, supra note 47, at 62; F. JENNINGS, THE IN-
VASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 34 (1975).
See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
49. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and the French Republic, April
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200, T.S. No. 86.
50. See INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES (C. Kappler ed. 1904).
51. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 115 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
52. See, e.g., Treaty with Delaware Indians, Sept. 17, 1778, art. 2, 7 Stat. 13 ("if
either of the parties are engaged in a just and necessary war with any other nation or na-
tions"); Treaty with Wyandot Indians, et al., July 22, 1814, art. 2, 7 Stat. 118 ("tribes
and bands above mentioned engage to give their aid to the United States in prosecuting
the war against Great Britain").
53. See, e.g., Treaty with Wyandot, Delaware, Chippawa and Ottawa Indians, et
al., Jan. 21, 1785, art. 3, 7 Stat. 35.
54. See, e.g., Treaty with Creek Indians, Aug. 7, 1856, art. 14, 11 Stat. 699;
Treaty with Quapaw Indians, Aug. 24, 1818, art. 6; Treaty with Sioux Indians, June
19, 1858, 12 Stat. 1031.
55. See, e.g., Treaty with Creek Indians, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35.
56. See, e.g., Treaty with Delaware Indians, Sept. 17, 1778, art. 5, 7 Stat. 13.
57. See, e.g., Treaty with Comanche Indians, Aug. 24, 1835, art. 9, 7 Stat. 474,
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States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the rela-
tions of peace and war, of being responsible in their political char-
acter for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression
committed on the citizens of the United States, by any individual
in their community .... The acts of our government plainly recog-
nize the Cherokee Nation as a State, and the courts are bound by
those acts. 58
He later concluded:
The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those
to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and conse-
quently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation," are words of our
own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings,
by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning.
We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to other
nations of the earth; they are applied to all in the same sense.50
Since 1871, the United States has refused to deal with Native
Americans by means of treaties. By an act of legislation, Congress de-
cided that Native American nations would no longer be recognized
as independent nations or powers.60 The United States refusal to en-
ter into a treaty, however, does not change the Indian tribes' capabil-
ity of doing so. The statute does not prevent native nations from en-
tering into treaties with other foreign powers; it is merely a charge
to the executive branch to desist from entering into any additional
treaties with Native Americans.
The United States has argued that even at the -time the treaties
were signed, the United States did not recognize them as enforceable
obligations in the international law sense of the term. That argument
deserves -two responses. First, it is contradicted by statements of the
United States own Supreme Court"' and Congress.02 Second, the
United States has obtained immeasurable benefits under those treaties,
most important, extinguishment of Native claims to millions of acres
of land. It cannot now deny benefits under provisions of those same
treaties to the other signatories.60 Native Americans today are still en-
58. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
59. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
60. Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
61. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
62. See Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
63. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 138 (1962).
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tirely capable of carrying on relations with foreign countries. The
main obstacle preventing them from doing so is the prohibition en-
forced by the United States government. Superiority in force of arms
and physical strength is no longer a valid means, under international
law, for interfering with one state's international political status.4
Native Americans have the skills and experience necessary to act
in the international community. 5 The desire and need to protect
their rights, resources and authority has led them to develop exper-
tise in business, law, government and diplomacy with which they can
quite adequately protect their interests at the international level. That
is in addition to their traditional ways of dealing with other peoples
that would be of much assistance to other nations of the world who
have forged less than a brilliant record in international peacekeeping.
That skill and expertise is demonstrated by their dealings with multi-
national corporations that, though nominally American in status, are
international in scope; by cooperative agreements which are negoti-
ated and executed with the United States and local governments
within the U.S. federal system; and by similar agreements and alli-
ances with each other. Even that small amount of land not taken from
Native Americans by the United States is well-endowed with natural
resources.66 Those resources, plus the skills which Indian nations have
developed and the agreements they have worked out with other gov-
ernments, would quite adequately sustain them on the international
level.
Although Indian tribes vary quite dramatically in their char-
acteristics and their circumstances, most qualify as states under in-
ternational law today, as they did before the arrival of Europeans.
Each tribe (or confederation of tribes) is entitled to have that deter-
mination made, based on the standards of international law.
B. Original Sovereignty
Although many native nations qualify as "states" under inter-
national law, there remains the question: what kind of state-fully
64. See text accompanying notes 136-37 infra.
65. See, e.g., M. GRIDLEY, INDIANS OF TODAY (4th ed. 1971); R. Bennett, Indian
Land Development: Good or Bad Economics? INDIAN VOICES (1970); SUBCOMMITTEE
ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., TowARD ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT FOR NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (Joint Comm. Print 1969).
66. H. HoUGH, DEVELOPMENT OF INDTAN RESOURCES (1967).
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independent, completely dependent, or something in between? Before
the arrival of Europeans, native nations of North America were, in
varying degrees, organized, self-governing entities. 7 Their independ-
ence and sovereign status was recognized by Europeans and was later
acknowledged by the United States after its independence.
Three European scholars of the Middle Ages, Francisco de
Vitoria, Emmerich de Vattel and Hugo Grotius, are recognized as
the developers of what has "come to be known as international law.00
Each gave either explicit or conceptual support to native sovereignty.
Vitoria considered "whether the aborigines in question were true own-
ers in both private and public law before the arrival of the Spaniards
. ... ,"70 He concluded that "[t]he upshot of all the preceding is, then,
that the aborigines undoubtedly had true dominion in both public
and private matters . . . .,71 Grotius considered impermissible the
Roman practice of asserting jurisdiction over a territory simply be-
cause it was occupied by a people whose government was different
from the Roman form.72 Alberico Gentili, a 16th century Spanish
jurist and professor of law, a predecessor of Grotius, considered na-
tives equal to other peoples under the law of nations.73 Vattel too has
stated:
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever,...
is a Sovereign State. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any
other state.... To give a nation a right to make an immediate figure
in this grand society, it is sufficient that it be really sovereign and in-
dependent, that is, that it govern itself by its own authority and
laws. 74
67. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
68. Sovereignty is defined as the "supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by
which any independent state is governed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1568 (4th rev.
ed. 1968). Accord, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.; 213 U.S. 347, 358
(1908); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793) (sovereignty is the
right to govern; a nation or state-sovereign is the international person in whom that
resides).
69. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States,
31 GEo. L.J. 1 (1942).
70. F. VITORrA, DE INDis ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES § 1, tit. 4, at 120 (E.
Nys ed. 1917).
71. Id., tit. 24, at 128.
72. H. GROTius, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 120 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
73. Id. at 89-90.
74. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAw OF NATiONs bk. 1, § 4 (J. Chitty trans. 1852) (1st
ed. Neuchatel 1758).
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Later European writers, including Spanish, 75 German, 76 Italian,77
French,78 and British,79 recognized the sovereignty of natives in the
"New World."
During the Middle Ages the Catholic Church was the only voice
advocating a universal order and rule of law, a position that had been
developed by the Greek and Roman Empires in earlier times.80 The
Church spoke out strongly in support of native sovereignty, a posi-
tion it did not consider inconsistent with a perceived moral duty to
Christianize the heathens.8' Bartolom6 de las Casas, a missionary priest,
authored several treatises defending Indian sovereignty in the New
World.8 Pope Paul III declared in the Bull Sublimis Deus in 1537:
The said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered
by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the
possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of
Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately,
enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property, nor should
they be in anyway enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall be
null and of no effect.83
Spanish colonial law (which formed the basis of current United
States domestic law on Indian affairs, and was itself heavily influenced
by the European scholars Vattel, Vitoria and Grotius) s4 explicitly rec-
ognized the rights of Indians, and therefore the authority of Indian
nations to establish those rights. The Law of 'the Indies provided that
Indian land rights should not be abridged 5 and that any Spanish farm
located to the prejudice of an Indian dweller would be removed.8 6
75. See, e.g., B. AYALA, ON THE LAW AND DUTIES CONNECTED WITH WAR AND
ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE (J. Bate trans. 1912).
76. HEFFTER, DAS EUROPAISCHE VOLKERRECHT (1867).
77. P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1886).
78. L. SOLOMtON, DE L'OCCUPATION DES TERRiTOIRES SANS MAITRE (1889);
JEZE, ETUDE THEORIQUE ET RUTIQUE SUR L'OCCUPATION CoIzIIaE MODE D'AcQuERIR
LES TERRITOIRES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1896).
79. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
80. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 81-82 (E. Walsh
ed. 1922).
81. See Losada, The Controversy Between Sepulveda and Las Casas in the Junta
of Valladolid, reprinted in BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS IN HISTORY 298-99 (J. Friede
& B. Keen eds. 1971).
82. See L. HANKE, BARTOLOMi DE LAS CASAS 44-46 (1951).
83. Papal Bull Sublimis Deus, cited in F. MAc NUTT, BARTHOLOMEW DE LAS
CASAS, His LIFE, HIS APOSTOLATE, AND HIS WRITINGS (1909).
84. Cohen, supra note 69.
85. Law of June 11, 1594 [RECOPILACION DE LEYES DE Los REYNOS DE LAS
INDIAS (1681) bk. 4, tit. 12, law 9].
86. Id. at bk. 2, tit. 31, law 13.
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British colonists, 7 and later the United States,"" recognized that
Indian nations were sovereign when the Europeans arrived. The Brit-
ish, Dutch, Spanish and French sought alliances with the Indian na-
tions in their ongoing struggle with each other,80 and recognized In-
dian sovereignty.90 Benjamin Franklin marveled that the Iroquis Con-
federacy "should be capable of forming a Scheme for such a Union,
and be able to execute it in such a Manner, as that it has subsisted
Ages, and appears indissolable."91 The Northwest Ordinance, passed
by the United States Congress in 1787, shows recognition of the In-
dians' rightful status:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians;
their lands and property shall never be taken from them without
their consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty they shall
never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars author-
ized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall,
from time to time, be made, for preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them."2
Henry Knox, Secretary of War under President Washington, declared
that "[t]he Indian tribes possess the right of the soil of all lands within
their limits, respectively, and that they are not to be divested thereof,
but in consequence of fair and bona fide purchases . . . .,03 He felt
that the tribes "ought to be considered foreign nations." 4 Thomas
Jefferson believed "the Indians had the full, undivided and independ-
ent sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it and that this might be
forever." 95
Perhaps most telling is the clarity with which the Supreme Court
has recognized and declared that Indian nations were sovereign enti-
ties at the time of the European invasion. In 1831, Chief Justice Mar-
shall commented: "So much of the argument as was intended to prove
87. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
88. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Chero.
kee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11 (1831).
89. See F. JENNINGS, supra note 48, at 38.
90. See J. BRODHEAD, COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF Nnw YORK 99
(1856); J. KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOsT-A CIVILIZATION WON 11-12 (1937); NATIVE
RIG3TS IN CANADA 97 (P. Cumming & N. Mickenberg eds. 1972).
91. 4 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 119 (L. Labaree & W. Bell, Jr., eds.
1961).
92. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, art. 3, 1 Stat. 50.
93. G. HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1789-1850, at 2 (1941).
94. Id. at 3.
95. F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE IN-
DIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 141 (1962).
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the character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society,
separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and gov-
erning itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been
completely successful." 96 One year later, Marshall observed that "[t]he
only inference to be drawn from [the articles of -the treaty] is, that
the United States considered the Cherokees as a Nation."9 7 Justice
Story also wrote:
There is no doubt that the Indian tribes, inhabiting this continent at
the time of its discovery, maintained a claim to the exclusive posses-
sion and occupancy of the territory within their respective limits, as
sovereigns and absolute proprietors of the soil .... Their right...
stood upon original principles deductible from the law of nature, and
could not be justly narrowed or extinguished without their own free
consent. 98
Recently, the Supreme Court has observed that "after 1871, the
tribes were no longer regarded as sovereign nations," 99 thus implying
that before 1871 they were sovereign nations.10 °
C. Native Sovereignty Has Not Been Terminated
Although Native Americans qualify as states under international
law, and were originally sovereign, independent states, the United
States has taken the position that circumstances have changed over
the years and Native Americans are now, at best, dependent nations''
subject to the will of the United States government. 02 Several theories
have been offered to justify that position, some purportedly based on
international law principles, some unique to United States domestic
law. This section will analyze these arguments.10 3
96. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
97. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553 (1832). See also McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973).
98. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 2, 3 (4th ed. 1873).
99. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975).
100. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
101. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
102. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
103. The arguments are more difficult to respond to because of the imprecision
and inconsistency with which they are offered. The United States-and particularly its
courts-offer at best only vague, general reasons to support restrictions on native sov-
ereignty. The matter is simply accepted as a political reality. Compare Beecher v.
Weatherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877), United States v. Santa Fe P. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 347 (1941), and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955),
with Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-45 (1832).
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1. Discovery and Occupation. International law is often glibly
cited as authority for the principle that discovery of North America
by European explorers gave their countries authority over the land
and its people.104 That theory is inaccurate both in its factual percep-
tion of North America and its analysis of international law. Euro-
peans did not discover North America. Native peoples had been here
for centuries before the first contact from Europeans. 1°5 If discovery
is a valid means of acquiring title and establishing sovereignty, then
Native Americans are the owners of and the sovereigns over North
America. As Vitoria observed, "the aborigines in question had true
dominion before the Spaniards arrived."'10 6
Even if the continent had been uninhabited, the European arri-
val would not have satisfied the requirements of international law for
establishing sovereignty. Discovery of a territory, the first arrival, does
not establish sovereignty until the land is settled and controlled. Dis-
covery must be followed by effective occupation. 07 England reacted
to the early Spanish claims in North America by stating that they had
"no claim to property there except that they had established a few
settlements and named rivers and capes . . . . Prescription without
possession is not valid."'' 08 The Permanent Court of Arbitration said
in the Island of Palmas case in 1928: "The title of discovery . . .
would, under the most favorable and most extensive interpretation,
exist only as an inchoate title, as a claim to establish sovereignty by
effective occupation."' 09 The United States government has recognized
this principle. In 1924 Secretary of State Hughes stated that "the dis-
covery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with a
formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sover-
eignty unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the
discovered country.""10
The United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized this prin-
104. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
105. D. QUINN, NORTH AMERi A FRO-m EARLIEST DISCOVERY TO FIRST SETTLE-
MENTS 1 (1975); C. WISSLER, supra note 23, at 27; F. JENNINGS, supra note 48, at 15.
106. F. VITORIA, supra note 70, tit. 7.
107. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 558-59 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed,
1955) ; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 146; E. DE VATTEL, supra note 74, at § 208.
108. Cheyney, International Law Under Queen Elizabeth, 20 ENGLISH HIST. REv.,
659, 660, 910 (1905).
109. 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 867, 867 (1928) (reporting the Island of Palmas Case
(United States v. Netherlands) (Penn. Ct. Arb. Hague 1928)).
110. 1 G. HACKIWORTH, supra note 13, at 399.
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ciple. Chief Justice Marshall discussed the effect of a charter given by
a European crown to a colony in North America:
It regulated the right given by discovery among the European dis-
coverers, but could not affect the rights of those already in posses-
sion, either as aboriginal occupants [or through earlier discovery].
... The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements
made on the sea-coast, or the companies under whom they were
made, acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or
occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man.
[T]hese grants asserted a title against Europeans only, and
were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives
were concerned.11 '
The simple act of landing on the shores of North America thus did
not establish sovereignty. Effective occupation requires "effective, un-
interrupted and permanent possession."' 112 Even in centuries follow-
ing the Europeans' "discovery," there remains a good deal of terri-
tory under native control which has never been occupied by non-
Indians.113
A second failing of this theory is that effective occupation is ap-
plicable only to uninhabited lands." 4 The Court in the Island of
Palmas case observed that "an inchoate title, however, can not prevail
over a definite title founded on continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty."" 5 If a land is inhabited, discovery extinguishes the ab-
original right only with the consent of the natives." 6 Some theorists
argued that in a legal sense North America was uninhabited because
the natives were savages who had not reached a degree of civilization
which would give them the right to have their sovereignty or control
of the land recognized." 7 That perception of Native Americans is in-
accurate, as well as irrelevant. Historians and anthropologists indicate
111. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-46 (1832).
112. 1 G. HAcxwoRTH, supra note 13, at 404.
113. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
114. F. VITORIA, supra note 70, § 2. See also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212 (1890).
115. 22 Am. J. INT'L L., supra note 109, at 867.
116. See F. VITORIA, supra note 70, § 2. See also Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543, 589-91 (1823).
117. See L. HANyE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS: A STUDY OF RACE
PREJUDICE IN THE MODERN .WORLD 44 (1975); J. SEPULVEDA, DEmOCRATES SEGUNDO
ODE LAS JUSTAS CAUSAS DE LA GUERRA CONTRA Los INDIOS (1951).
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that even at the time of the European arrival Natives had highly
developed cultures, governmental systems, laws, religions, and social
systems." 8 In fact, based on the treatment which the white people
showed toward Indians and vice versa, it was the whites, rather than
the natives, who were the savages.1 9 Whether from ignorance, or from
the inability or unwillingness to appreciate a culture different from
their own, Europeans simply misstated the facts in describing Native
Americans as uncivilized.
International law recognizes that social, political or technical
advancement is not a valid measure of the rights to which a people
is entitled. 2 0 Some of the earliest and most respected writers argued
that Europeans' actions in North America violated the basic principles
of international law.12' They said that Indians--even if heretics and
savages-were entitled to have their territory and political integrity
respected. Vitoria pointed out that this principle was recognized by
the Church in Europe and as early as ancient Palestine.122 Thus, the
European nations had no authority over the natives, but could deter-
mine rules and guidelines (establish "trade and proselytizing zones"'12)
only for their dealings with each other. The continuous attempts by
Europeans to force "aid" on natives and assert dominion over them
in order to civilize them was deemed contrary to the standards of nat-
ural law.
Many writers added a qualification to the principle of discovery
which would justify European settlements in North America. Vattel,
for example, wrote that the "law of nature and nations" requires that
land should be cultivated or otherwise put to use. No group of people
has a right to occupy more land than it needs to support itself. Since
North America was a vast area capable of supporting more than just
the natives, they could be required to surrender portions of the land
for settlement by others.124 But that limitation is in no way incon-
118. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
119. See F. JENNINGS, supra note 48, at 36-41; R. MARDOCK, THE RnFORMERS
AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 69-70 (1971); R. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS 27 (1973);
D. WRONE & R. NELSON, WHO'S THE SAVAGE? A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
MISTREATMENT OF THE NATIVE NORTH AMERICANS (1973).
120. H. GROTIUS, supra note 72, at 61.
121. See, e.g., E. DE VATTEL, supra note 74, bk. 1, §§ 203-10.
122. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 44 (1947) (discussing
Vitoria's suggestion that Indian land titles were entitled to respect).
123. Id. (paraphrasing F. VITORIA, supra note 70, tit. 10).
124. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 74, bk. 1, § 81.
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sistent with native sovereignty, and has no effect on the right to in-
dependence and self-government of Native Americans. 25
Native Americans have always been more than willing to share
the resources of this land. From the first European arrival in North
America to the present, natives have assisted and tried to accommodate
foreignersi 6 Many colonies and settlements would not have survived
their humble and harsh beginnings without the aid -of the natives. 2 7
Much sharing of resources and skills takes place today, ranging from
native medicines and healing skills -to natural resources lying on and
under Indian land.28 From their first contact with Europeans, natives
sought an accommodation that would allow each group the land and
resources it needed, asking only that they be left to maintain their
own ways of life. Several hundred treaties, as well as other con-
tractual dealings and outright gifts, attest to 'the willingness of Native
Americans to share -the land with non-Indians. As the natives were
gradually pushed westward across the continent for four centuries,
they maintained their willingness to recognize the rights of all people
to coexist on the land, and continually thought they were signing
agreements which assured those rights.'2 9 Conflict has occurred because
non-Indians have used the principle to justify their actions but then
have ignored it when they have wanted to encroach on the lands
natives need to support themselves.
2. Conquest. Another explanation sometimes offered -to justify as-
sertion of authority over Native Americans is that they were conquered
by the Europeans and are therefore rightfully subject to non-Indian
jurisdiction. 30 Conquest does not, however, stand up under inter-
125. The requirement that natives relinquish control of land excess to their needs,
even if it is accepted as valid, does not pretend to limit native sovereignty on the land
retained. The Europeans were simply trying to justify their presence in a land which
was already inhabited. They were not arguing that their coming reduced the status of
Native Americans as a sovereign nation.
126. A. BROWN, THE FIRST REPUBLIC IN AMERICA 41-42 (1898); F. JENNINGS,
supra note 48, ch. 3.
127. A. DEBO, supra note 34, at 45; F. JENNINGS, supra note 48, ch. 3.
128. V. VOGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN MEDICINE (1970); C. WiSSLER, supra note 20,
ch. 23.
129. See generally V. DELORIA, supra note 29; INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREA-
TIES, supra note 50.
130. It is not entirely clear that the United States relies on conquest as the basis
of its authority. After its independence from Britain, the United States took the posi-
tion that the Indians were conquered peoples. F. PRUCHA, supra note 95, at 34. It
quickly abandoned that claim, however, when military skirmishes made it clear that the
United States was not able to assert its will over the Indians. W. WASHBURN, THE IN-
DIAN IN A mRcA 158-60 (1975). The young nation's first pronouncement on the sub-ject, the Northwest Ordinance, promised respect for native rights. In 1872, the Coin-
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national law as a justification for restricting native sovereignty. First,
it is not an accurate description of the facts. Many native nations were
never subdued by means of military force.' 3 ' Many peace and friend-
ship treaties between Native Americans and the United States (or its
predecessors) were signed in situations where the Indians held a
superior military position.132 Chief Justice Marshall described the
colonists' fear that the natives would join Great Britain, and their
consequent effort to enlist the aid of the Indians: "Far from advancing
a claim to their lands, or asserting any right of dominion over them,
Congress revolved [sic], 'that the securing and preserving the friend-
ship of the Indian nations appears to be a subject of the utmost
moment to these colonies.' "1' Treaties were therefore signed "to pre-
serve peace and friendship."' 34
It is significant to note that the United States has throughout
its history used physical force and violence to drive Indians from their
land. The military and law enforcement arms of the government have
played a central role in this country's taking of native lands and
resources and denial of fundamental human rights.3 5 Under contem-
porary international law, United States policies are illegal and con-
trary to basic standards set forth in a number of international agree-
ments and documents. The movement to ban force as a valid tool in
international dealings began around the turn of the century, picked
up momentum after World War I and climaxed after World War II
in the adoption of the United Nations Charter. Scholars and national
missioner of Indian Affairs reported that in its 85 years of existence the United States
had scrupulously respected the Indians' right to their land, obtaining it only when the
Indians agreed to sell. In his 1890 Report, the Commissioner reiterated that "the gov-
ermnent has never extinguished an Indian title as by right of conquest [with one ex-
ception where the tribe involved was later compensated for its land and provided with
another reservation]. W. WASHBURN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE UNITED STATES 176,
435 (1973). Thomas Jefferson made the same observation in his time. See S. PADOVER,
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 632 (1943). See also W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/
WHITE MAN'S LAW 56-57 (1971).
131. See S. AMBROSE, CRAzY-HORSE AND OUSTER (1975); W. & E. HARTLEY,
OSCEOLA: THE UNCONQUERED INDIAN 93 (1973); J. OLSON, RED CLOUD AND THE
SIoux PROBLEM 247-50 (1965); D. VAN EVERY, DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT
OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 191 (1966); G. WALTON, FEARLESS AND FREE, THE SnMI-
NOLE INDIAN WAR, 1835-42 (1977).
132. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550 (1832); V. DELORIA, supra
note 29, ch. 6.
133. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
134. Id. See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 622 (1970).
135. See D. BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971); A. DEno, THE
ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE (1967); H. JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR (1974); G.
JAHODA, TRAIL OF TEARS (1975); K. KICKNOBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED
MILLION ACRES (1973); H. MINER, THE CORPORATION AND THE INDIAN (1976).
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leaders now almost unanimously agree that force employed against
the political and territorial integrity of another state is illegal,13 and
that this principle is a part of customary international law.13 7
The United States continues to threaten and use force to take
land from and deny fundamental human rights and self-government
to Native Americans; those actions are therefore illegal and cannot
be considered valid limitations on native sovereignty. Examples are
not hard to find. Many of the policies of the United States govern-
ment and its subdivisions constitute violence against Indian people
and their rights. Outright killings and other physical brutality are too
common to be coincidental. 138 Welfare and child protection agencies
remove Indian children from their homes at rates far in excess of the
rate found among non-Indians. White case workers apply the cultural
standards of non-Indian society in order to condemn the home and
family practices of Indians and justify removing the children from
their homes. 3 9 The educational system set up by the United States
for Indian children provides a few large schools which often require
that the Indian children be taken from their homes and forced to
live at the school, separated from their families for large parts of the
year. Indian children are punished for using their native language,
and are taught a white version of history that has no regard for the
history of their own people and that ignores or skims over the bru-
tality the United States has exhibited toward Indians. 40 Government
136. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, art. II, 46 Stat. 2343; League of Na-
tions Covenant, art. 12, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. (1920); U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para.
4 ("all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations"); Declaration on Prin-
ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 28, 121, U.N. Doe. A/8082 (1970); Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); Treaty of Non-Aggression and Con-
ciliation, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3305; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 173.
137. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, ch. 22; R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 53 (1963).
138. K. KICKINGBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, supra note 135, at 183; B. ZIMMERMAN,
AIRLIFT TO WOUNDED KNEE (1976); The Quality of American Justice, Akwesasne
Notes, vol. 8, no. 2, at 32 (1976); Courtroom Clash at Sioux Falls, Akwesasne Notes,
vol. 6, no. 2, at 14 (1974).
139. S. UNGER, THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES (1977);
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT ON INDIAN EDUCATION
(1976); INDIAN FAMILY DEFENSE, BULLETIN No. 10 (1978); The Future is the Fam-
ily, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 9, no. 2, at 4 (1977); Mindell & Gurwitt, The Placement
of American Indian Children-The Need for Change, 1977 AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH.
140. OKLAHOMA STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN OKLAHOMA 14-15 (1974).
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hospitals have sterilized Indian women, often without informed con-
sent, at a rate far greater than their percentage of the population would
dictate.141
In addition to those direct, open uses of force, the United States
has employed more subtle methods of limiting native sovereignty
with the threat of force. Congress has enacted laws which place severe
limitations on native sovereignty and take away property and other
resources from Indian tribes. Those laws are enacted by a legislative
body which has no native representation. If Indians refuse to acknowl-
edge and obey those laws, they will be enforced against Indians by
the United States courts, marshals and other law enforcement agencies.
It is therefore fully accurate to say that restrictions on native sov-
ereignty are today being imposed by the United States against the
wishes of Native Americans by the threat and use of force. Examples
include the Indian Claims Commission,142 which awards damages to
tribes for what the United States admits were illegal, fraudulent or
unfair takings of land. The Commission has no authority to return
the land, which is what tribes need to protect and reassert their sov-
ereignty. The Commission merely seeks to legitimize the theft of
native land with money payments. The Indian Reorganization Act 148
has been used to coerce tribes to adopt an Anglo form of government
and limits the powers of tribal government. Public Law 280144 allows
the governments of subdivisions within the United States to assert
jurisdiction and enforce some of their laws within Indian reservations.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,4 ' "resolves" conflicting
Alaskan land claims by limiting Natives to a certain number of acres
and paying them off for the rest of their claims. It requires natives
to set up economic corporations on the western capitalist model in
order to 'take advantage of the money payments. The Bureau of
Indian Affairs sells and leases land and resources without the consent
of, and usually on terms disadvantageous to, the native owners.140
141. Killing Our Future, Sterilization and Experiments, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 9,
no. 1, at 4 (1974); Sterilization of Native Women Charged to IHS, Akwesasne Notes,
vol. 6, no. 5, at 6 (1975).
142. 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70w (1976).
143. Id. §§ 461-479.
144. Id. §§ 1321-1323.
145. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (Supp. V 1975).
146. K. TOOLE, THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS 51 (1976); U.S. CIVIL RIO1TS
CoMMIssbON, THE NAVAJO NATION: AN AMERICAN COLONY 23-24, 122-26 (1975);
Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 1950-53: A Case Study in Bureaucracies, 62 YALE
L.J. 348, 364-65 (1953); The Navajo Nation and Resource Development, Akwesasne
Notes, vol. 10, no. 3, at 26 (1978); Killing the Earth, Air, Water, Akwesasne Notes,
vol. 9, no. 1, at 8 (1977).
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Native sovereignty and property are therefore being infringed by the
United States with the threat and use of force, in direct violation of
accepted principles of international law. That illegal use of force
cannot be claimed as a basis for authority over Native Americans.
International law does provide that the validity of an action
must be judged by the legal standards which were in effect at the time
of the action.147 What, then, are we to conclude about the use of
force to deprive Native Americans of their property and rights before
the use of force was condemned by international law? It is important
to note that even before the ban on the use of force by international
law there were limitations on its use.148 Grotius wrote that injury
inflicted on a nation is the only just cause of war 49 and that "war is
not to be undertaken, except for the enforcement of law, nor is it
to be waged, when undertaken, except for the enforcement prescribed
by law and good faith."' 50
The Supreme Court, speaking of the European colonies in North
America, noted that "The power of war is given only for defence, not
conquest."' s ' No one argues that the United States was fighting in
self-defense when it attacked native people; nor that it was main-
taining any rights that natives were infringing. The United States
used military force against Indians to remove them from their land,
to open those lands to non-Indian settlement and exploitation of
natural resources' 52
Another rule of international law invalidates the argument that
the United States has acquired dominion over Native Americans by
conquest: 53 Conquest was recognized as a mode of acquiring territory
"only if the conquered territory was effectively reduced to possession
and annexed by the conquering state."' 54 Even the United States
own concept of its authority over Native Americans does not satisfy
147. R. JENNINGS, supra note 137, at 53.
148. Vattel noted that "[tihe right of employing force, or making war, belongs to
nations no farther than is necessary for their own defense and for the maintenance of
their rights." E. DE VATTEL, supra note 74, bk. 3, § 26. "[A] nation is not allowed to
attack another with a view to aggrandize itself by subduing and giving law to latter.
This is just the same as if a private person should attempt to enrich himself by seizing
his neighbor's property." Id. bk. 1, § 184.
149. H. GROTIUS, supra note 72, at 61.
150. Id. at 25.
151. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54 (1832).
152. See note 135 supra.
153. See generally G. HAcKWORTH, supra note 13.
154. Id. at 427.
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that definition. The multitude of treaties between the United States
and various Indian tribes reserve a large amount of land covering a
sizeable total area to Native Americans.155 Further, control of internal
tribal affairs is reserved to the tribes even according to United States
law.15 6 The United States has never asserted possession or jurisdiction
over reservations so as to qualify for acquisition by conquest, even
under the terms of pre-20th century international law. Native Ameri-
cans have retained a land base and a degree of authority which, even
under the restrictive terms of domestic United States law, negates
any argument that conquest has taken away native sovereignty.
3. Cession, Agreement. Another argument often advanced is that
Native Americans have agreed to be included within the United
States and to be subordinated to the United States Government. By
signing treaties which affirmed their allegiance to the United States
and their desire for its protection, it is said that Indian tribes sur-
rendered whatever sovereignty -they had at the time. The argument
continues that the actions of the United States and Native Americans
since treaty times reinforce the concept of voluntary merger; they are
United States citizens, they have transferred their land to the United
States, they have accepted benefits from the government and partici-
pated in government and politics, both as individuals and as tribes, and
they have reorganized their tribal affairs based on United States law.157
That argument is directly contradicted by international law, which
holds that association with another state does not necessarily result in a
surrender of sovereignty. Vattel expressed the general rule:
We ought, therefore, to account as sovereign states those which
have united themselves to another more powerful, by an unequal
alliance ....
The conditions of those unequal alliances may be infinitely
varied. But whatever they are, provided the inferior ally reserve to
itself the sovereignty, or the right of governing its own body, it ought
to be considered as an independent state, that keeps up an intercourse
with others under the authority of the law of nations. 58
155. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
156. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977); Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1895); United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1885).
157. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REvIEw CobimissIoN, SEPARATE DIsSENTING
ViEws, FINAL REPORT 574 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY Rn-
vIEw COMMISSION].
158. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 74, bk. 1, § 5.
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The United States clearly recognized that principle and applied it to
Native Americans.
To construe the expression "managing all their affairs," into a
surrender of self-government, would be, we think, a perversion of their
necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction which has
been uniformly put on them ....
... The very fact of repeated treaties with [Indian tribes] recognizes
[the Indians' right to self-government]; and the settled doctrine of
the law of nations is that a weaker power does not surrender its in-
dependence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide
for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more pow-
erful without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceas-
ing to be a State.159
That would be the law even if native nations had agreed to the
partial delegation of authority which the United States has decreed.
But the Indians did not willingly agree, or understand that they were
agreeing, to any large scale transfers of their rights, authority and
autonomy when they signed the treaties. 160 The United States Su-
preme Court recently observed that "[t]he Indian Nations did not seek
out the United States and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-
length transaction. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they
had no choice but to consent."'161 Indian people have continuously ob-
jected to infringements on their sovereignty. 62 Many of the treaties
were fraudulently imposed. They were written in English and United
States negotiators often misrepresented the contents of the treaties. 63
Even more common was the United States' policy of abiding by a
treaty agreement only until it wanted more land, at which point it
would ignore the treaty, argue that it should be interpreted differ-
ently, or coerce the Indians into signing a new agreement giving up
more of their land. The military's presence in the background often
159. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54, 560-61 (1832).
160. Id. at 560-61.
161. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970); see Whitefoot
v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 367 U.S. 818 (1962).
162. See note 177 infra.
163. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); Whitefoot v. United
States, 293 F.2d 658, 667 n.15 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 367 U.S. 818 (1962); L.
SCHMECKEBEIR, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ITS HiSTORY, ACTIVITIES AND OR-
GANIZATION 59 (1927); Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abro-
gation, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975).
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implied that the Indians would suffer if ,they did not consent. 10 That
course of action has become as well recognized as it is notorious, ad-
mitted even by the United States itself;165 thus, the United States Con-
gress established an Indian Claims Commission to compensate for those
improprieties.16 6 International law has always condemned the use of
such deception. Vattel wrote:
[G]ood faith demands ... that each party should express his prom-
ises clearly, and without the least ambiguity. The faith of treaties is
basely prostituted by studying to couch them in vague or equivocal
terms, to introduce ambiguous expressions, to reserve subjects of dis-
pute, to overreach those with whom we treat, and outdo them in
cunning and duplicity. ... Subterfuges in a treaty are not less con-
trary to good faith .... [A]n evidently false interpretation is the gross-
est imaginable violation of the faith of treaties. 67
Therefore, even if the treaties contained any surrender of sovereignty,
they were often unwilling concessions.
The Indians' understanding of the treaties was consistent with
Vattel's and Marshall's descriptions of "unequal alliances." As Mar-
shall discussed in Worcester v. Georgia, the Indians perceived the
treaties as a promise of protection, and not as any surrender of sov-
ereignty, except in the particulars agreed in the treaties.'6 " The In-
dians regarded land as available for the use of all members of the
group. They often thought that the treaties entitled whites to come
into their area; they did not agree or understand that they were to
be excluded from land they had traditionally inhabited. And regard-
less of the various understandings and misunderstandings as to the
use of land, they certainly did not knowingly relinquish any of their
164. A. BLEDSOE, INDIAN WARS OF THE NORTHWEST 158"60 (1885); W. BRAN-
DON, THE LAST AMERICANS 274 (1974); G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 198, 236
(1932); W. HAGEN, AMERICAN INDIANS 55-56 (1961); G. HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 174, 188-91, 197, 361 (1941); A. JOSEPHY, THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF
AMERICA 282-84 (1968); 0. McNiCKLE, THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES
39 (1962); S. MORISON, W. COMAGER & D. LEUCHTENBURO, THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 439-40 (6th ed. 1969); W. WASHBURN, THE INDIANS IN AMERICA
17-96 (1975).
165. "It is not denied that wrong was often done in fact to tribes in the negotia-
tion of treaties of cession. The Indians were not infrequently overborn or deceived by
agents of the Government in these transactions .... " REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1872).
166. [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1347.
167. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 74, bk. 2, §§ 231-233. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 51, §§ 3, 158.
168. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see text accompanying notes 158-63 supra.
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sovereignty. 169 As Vitoria stated, fear and ignorance vitiate any con-
sent to be governed.170 In short, the United States explained the trea-
ties to -the Indians in one way, and now claims a quite different in-
terpretation.
Native Americans have ceded and sold a great deal of land to the
United States and to private purchasers. Many of those sales were not
voluntary. They were often made after persuasion or promises from
government officials, "trustees" appointed for "incompetent" Indians
(a common fiction used to ease land away from natives), and other
Indians whom the government had pressured or bribed into advocat-
ing the non-Indian cause. Sales were often made without the consent
of the Indian owner (his signature was forged or one signature would
be obtained for a parcel with many joint owners); many times he
was coerced and 'threatened until he agreed.'7 But even if some
of the land sales and cessions were considered valid, they would not
change the fact that Indian tribes have retained millions of acres of
land under their control and jurisdiction, land that is a more than
adequate basis for their sovereignty. 7 2 Further, even if the treaties
could in some way be considered a surrender of sovereignty, any such
grant would have to be considered long ago rescinded by virtue of the
wholesale violation of the treaties by the United States. The United
States cannot ignore its treaty obligations, and then insist that con-
cessions made by the Indians are still binding.173
Another element of the "agreement" argument is that the wide-
spread participation by Indians in American government and society
operates as a waiver of any claim to sovereignty. That argument is not
persuasive because Indians have been forced into the non-Indian sys-
tem against their will. Indians were made citizens of this country with-
out their consent. 7 4 They have been forced to depend on Anglo gov-
ernments, to observe United States laws, to participate in the legal,
political and economic systems in this country, to organize themselves
on the American model, all because :their resources and culture have
been devastated by the United States. The United States has taken In-
dian land and resources, forced them to abandon their traditional ways
169. See text accompanying notes 158-63 supra.
170. F. VITORM, supra note 70, § 2, para. 16; see Cohen, supra note 69, at 13.
171. See, e.g., A. DEBO, supra note 135, ch. 17; K. KKICINGBIRD & K. DUCHE-
NEAUX, supra note 135.
172. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
173. See RESTATEMENT, SUpra note 51, §§ 138, 158.
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976).
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and tried to force -them into the western mold.1 5 Given the numbers,
the technology and the use of force which have characterized the non-
Indian society, it is not surprising that Indians have bent under the
pressure and adopted some non-Indian ways. Indian tribes and people
have, in recent years, begun to reverse that process and recover their
traditional ways of life, social organization and government. But that
will likely be a long, slow process, which will permit only a gradual
divorce from the American system. Native people are entitled to an
opportunity ,to choose how they will be governed and to have returned
to them the resources needed for self-sufficiency. It is therefore not ac-
curate or reasonable to say that participation in non-Indian systems is
an agreement by Indians to give up their sovereignty.
4. Acquisitive Prescription. One method sometimes recognized in
international law for establishing title to land is acquisitive prescrip-
tion, a concept akin to adverse possession in English common law. It
allows a nation to cure a defect in title or wrongful origin of title by
the exercise of control over an extended period. The possession must
be peaceful and uninterrupted and must be with the acquiescence of
the original sovereign and other sovereigns. 76 There is disagreement
over whether prescription is a valid means of acquiring title. How-
ever, even if it is recognized, it is not applicable to Native American
lands. First, Native Americans have retained a share of their lands
which the United States does not possess. Second, in those lands where
the United States has coerced or assumed a transfer from the Indians,
its possession has not been peaceful; Native Americans have consis-
tently opposed the white occupation, and the United States has often
reverted to force, or the threat of its use, to maintain or establish pos-
session.
Similarly, United States possession has not been with the acqui-
escence of all other sovereigns. The native nations have not willingly
agreed to United States control. 77 An arbitration decision in a case in-
volving the United States and Mexico discussed those principles:
Without thinking it necessary to discuss the very controversial ques-
tion as to whether the right of prescription invoked by the United
175. See A. DEBO, supra note 34; F. JENNINGS, supra note 48; F. PRuOirAj
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS (1976); AMERICANIZINO THE AMiERiaAN INDIANS
(F. Prucha ed. 1973).
176. R. JENNINGS, supra note 137, at 23-24.
177. "If the [original sovereign] keeps its claim alive by protest or the bringing
of an action, there will not be that undisturbed or 'peaceable' possession which alone
enables a State to prescribe a title." Frontier Land Case, [1959] I.O.J. 209, 227. See
also R. JENNINGS, supra note 137, at 23; A. JOSEPHY, RED PowER 9-15 (1971); V.
DELORA, supra note 29, at 20-21.
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States is an accepted principle of the law of nations, in the absence
of any convention establishing a term of prescription, the commis-
sioners are unanimous in coming to the conclusion that the posses-
sion of the United States in the present case was not of such a char-
acter as to found a prescriptive title. Upon the evidence adduced it
is impossible to hold that the possession of El Chamizal by United
States was undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged.... On the
contrary it may be said that physical possession taken by citizens of
the United States and the political control exercised by the local and
federal government have been constantly challenged and questioned
by the Republic of Mexico, through its accredited diplomatic
agents.178
Also, the reasoning applicable to land acquisition described above 7 9
would control here even if acquisitive prescription were applicable.
Acquisition of title to even the bulk of North America by the United
States would not terminate Native American statehood and sover-
eignty, since natives still retain control of a good deal -of territory
and fulfill the other requirements of statehood.1 80
5. Changed Circumstances. Non-Indians often point to the sub-
stantial changes which have taken place in both Indian and non-In-
dian societies as justification for restriction on native sovereignty.
They argue that even if Indians have not explicitly surrendered their
sovereignty, changed circumstances have made that sovereignty un-
realistic.181 A general category, -tentatively suggested by one writer to
justify changes in title or jurisdiction when none of the traditional
concepts will work, is termed historical consolidation.8 2 That princi-
ple focuses not on the origin of possession or its development, but on
the current nature of possession, the way in which authority is being
exercised and the political relationships among contending sovereigns.
In some ways it is similar to acquiescence or estoppel in that it vali-
dates a situation that has been accepted because of the passage of time
despite questionable origins and practices.
178. Chamizal Arbitration (United States v. Mexico) June 15, 1911, cited in
G. HACKWORTH, supra note 13, at 441-42. It is not valid to argue that Indian protests
have not been strong enough. Again, from the Chamizal Arbitration:
It is quite clear -from the circumstances related in this affidavit that however
much the Mexicans may have desired to take physical possession of the district,
the iesult of any attempt to do so would have provoked scenes of violence and
the Republic of Mexico cannot be blamed for the milder forms of protest con-
tained in its diplomatic correspondence.
Id. at 442.
179. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 14-66 supra.
181. See AMERICAN INmAN POLICY REvIEw CoMMIssION, supra note 157, at 574.
182. See R. JENNINGS, supra note 137, at 23, 27.
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Historical consolidation has not been accepted as a valid princi-
ple under international law. Its originator did so only tentatively, sug-
gesting that it might be a useful term; he then went on to say, "that
it has never been, as it were, spelled out as a doctrine by any court."'' s3
Even if historical consolidation were a valid principle, it could not be
properly applied to Native Americans. The concept seems to be in-
tended for a situation where changed circumstances have come to be
mutually accepted as the most realistic way of handling the situation
by the parties involved. It seems designed to validate a situation that
is on the whole reasonable, but has some technical defect in its legal
justification. Circumstances in which Native Americans find them-
selves do not fit that pattern. The relationship imposed on them by
the United States is not at all reasonable from the standpoint of either
Indians or of non-Indians. 8 4 The "defect" which the United States
seeks to remedy is not a mere technical violation of some abstract prin-
ciple but rather a continuing policy of violations of the sovereign and
individual human rights of Native Americans. It is a brutal, ill-con-
ceived and inconsistent attempt to maintain a colonial form of ex-
ploitation of the lands and resources of native people. The United
States has violated and continues to violate a number of provisions of
international law in order to effect and maintain the conditions which
it seeks to validate. The principle is designed to validate political re-
lationships that have come to be accepted as legitimate because they
reflect current realities and are realistic and reasonable for the people
involved. It perhaps ignores the historical questions of illegality and
impropriety, but it cannot ignore continuing violations of interna-
tional law. An assertion of authority-of title and jurisdiction-which
conflicts with accepted standards of international law cannot be legiti-
mized by reference to the principle of historical consolidation when it
is maintained only by virtue of the dominant state's superiority in
numbers, strength and technology. International jurisprudence pro-
vides that ex injuria jus non oritur-acts contrary to law-cannot be-
come a source of legal rights for the wrongdoer. 8 5
Another rule which might justify changing the law when cir-
cumstances have changed is the principle of rebus sic stantibus.180
183. Id. at 27.
184. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 157, at 601;
C. WILLIAMS & W. NEUBRECr, INDIAN TREATIES: AMERICAN NIGHTMARE (1976).
185. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 498; R. JENNINGS, supra note 137, at 54.
186.
An international agreement is subject to the implied condition that a sub-
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Rebus sic stantibus has uncertain qualifications under international
law: "International tribunals and other courts, while not denying the
existence of the doctrine, have generally avoided giving it effect, usu-
ally on the ground that it was not applicable to the facts at hand."'87
The Permanent Court of International Justice was presented with the
argument, but refused to rule on the issue since key allegations were
missing. "The Court did not state whether it would apply the doctrine
if the facts were proved."'188
The principle is by its own terms inapplicable to Native Ameri-
cans. Conditions which "were an essential basis of a consent to be
bound" have not changed so as to "radically transform the scope of
the obligations" to which the parties agreed. 8 9 The Indian treaties-
which are to be interpreted as the Indians understood them 90- -
were intended to guarantee various rights and elements of sovereignty
to the Indians. Native Americans are capable and desirous of exercis-
ing their right of self-government, and would still be in a position to
do so were it not for the actions of the United States which violate
international law. Even if conditions had changed so as to satisfy the
language of the principle, it would nevertheless be inapplicable. First,
the principle cannot be used to negate a treaty which has established
a boundary.' 9 ' Since most treaties signed by Native American nations
delineated boundaries between native and non-native areas, the United
States cannot rely on rebus sic stantibus to withdraw recognition of
those agreements. Second, a nation may rely on the principle only if
it did not cause the change in circumstances by action inconsistent
with the purpose of the agreement.192 Since Native nations understood
that treaties would preserve their existence and protect their status as
separate groups apart from the incoming whites, the subsequent ac-
tions of the United States that have violated and compromised their
stantial change . . . in a state of facts existing at the time when the agreement
became effective, suspends or terminates... the obligations . . . to the extent
that the continuation of the state of facts was of such importance . . . that
the parties would not have intended the obligations to be applicable under the
changed circumstances.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 153(1).
187. Id. § 153, comment.
188. Id. at 471.
189. S. RoSENNE, supra note 46, art. 59(1) (b).
190. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1975); Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 625 (1969); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S.
404,406 (1968).
191. S. ROSENNE, supra note 46, art. 59(2) (a).
192. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, § 153.
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separate existence are inconsistent with the purpose of the agreements.
That caveat is expressed in slightly different language by the Vienna
Convention. 193 It would preclude reliance on rebus sic stantibus if the
change in conditions is a result of a breach either of the treaty or of
some other international obligation by the party seeking to invoke the
principle. Since the change in conditions under which Native Ameri-
cans live has been caused by the United States-expanding its popu-
lation into areas occupied by Native Americans, forcibly relocating
Indians, exploiting and taking land and resources from the natives-
the United States may not limit native sovereignty on the basis of a
change in conditions since the time treaties were signed.
194
Although tribes have a wide variety of histories and circum-
stances, the general conclusion is that none of the arguments offered
by non-Indians justifies existing limitations on native sovereignty. The
United States blithely assumes that it has legitimately restricted native
sovereignty. As noted at the beginning of this section, courts in par-
ticular have not presented a clear analysis for that conclusion. A more
careful consideration of the facts and the applicable law would reveal
some surprises.
II. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Discussion of the concept of self-determination has come to inter-
national law only recently. The appearance of this idea represents one
part of a significant change which has taken place in international law
and in the practice of states in their international affairs. Prior to the
20th century, international law used the rule of force and physical
power as the foundation for international relations. Stronger sover-
eigns were able to dictate to weaker nation-states international policies
and laws that would be followed by the world community. There has
been a dramatic change during the 20th century in at least the theory,
if not entirely in the practice, of international law towards basing
those relations on principles of equality and respect for the rights and
integrity of states and peoples. That change has been manifest both
in the substantive provisions of international law and in the pro-
193. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 46, art. 59.
194. Although rebus sic stantibus applies by its terms only to agreements, the
United States uses a similar argument in denying Indians their aboriginal rights. The
principle is inapplicable for the same reasons that it does not justify changes in treaty
agreements.
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cedure or process by which international affairs are carried on and in-
ternational law is developed and applied.
One result of that change is the recognition of the need for pro-
tection of individual human rights. A related development, but one
which is broader in scope, is respect for the integrity of peoples and
states. That development has been embodied in recognition and, to
some extent, implementation of the right to self-determination. Self-
determination has progressed from an abstract and idealistic theory to
an international legal right that is firmly established in international
legal documents and is being defined more specifically and imple-
mented as time goes on. The concept of unit self-determination is de-
fined most broadly as "the right to determine one's own fate,"' 95 and
more specifically as the "right freely to determine without external
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social
and cultural development."'196
A. Development of the Concept
Self-determination has a broad historical base. The concept grew
out of the spirit of nationalism that evolved and mushroomed during
the 17th and 18th centuries, and was expressed in such events as the
French and American revolutions. The essence of nationalism or pop-
ular sovereignty was that "government should be based on the will of
the people, not on that of the monarch, and people not content with
the government of the country to which they belong should be able
to secede and organize themselves as they wish."' 97 The sovereignty of
the monarch was replaced by the sovereignty of the people, and in
the new sovereign, the nation, was vested the sole authority to exer-
cise the right of sovereignty. Thus, in its beginnings, self-determina-
tion was equated with the political idea that nations have a right to
sovereign independence, and with the people's desire to be free from
external or internal domination. The concept of self-determination
continued to develop through the 19th century in Europe; states were
unified as a result of national movements which were based on the
195. Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the
Wilsonian Concept, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1976).
196. Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, supra note 136, at 123.
197. J. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17
(1973).
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principles of self-determination. The term itself was first used by Ger-
man philosophers and scholars who derived it from the German word
selbstbestimmungsrecht.198
Formalization of the concept coincided with the first attempt to
establish a mechanism which would regulate international affairs. Dis-
cussions which led to the creation of the League of Nations included
considerable emphasis on the need to protect the right to self-deter-
mination. One of the strongest advocates of the concept was President
Woodrow Wilson, who remarked, "every people has a right to choose
the sovereignty under which they shall live."'"9 Later, in an ad-
dress to Congress in 1917, he stated: "No peace can last, or ought to
last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that govern-
ments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed
and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sover-
eignty to sovereignty as if they were property."200 The concept was in-
stitutionalized to some extent by such actions as establishments of Man-
date Territories by -the League of Nations, which provided for interna-
tional oversight of certain areas which had been colonies of the powers
defeated in World War I. Those that had advocated protection of the
right to self-determination emphasized the rights of national minorities.
The Turkish Government's extermination of the vast majority
of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire and the even
more egregious acts against the Jewish people by Hitler's Third Reich
led the international community to establish some restrictions and
guidelines on, and mechanisms for dealing with, not only conduct be-
tween states but actions within a state which violate fundamental hu-
man rights and other elements of international law. The Nuremberg
War Crimes Trials indicated that international authority would be
used to punish nations and persons who violated those standards.
There was a consensus that certain actions by states were so contrary
to accepted standards as to be crimes against humanity and that the
nations committing such wrongs should be punished.
Among those developments was a definitive recognition of the
right to self-determination. The United Nations Charter recognized
that the right to self-determination must be protected if the basic goals
of the organization, to maintain world peace and security, were to be
198. U. UMOZURUKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1972).
199. 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds.
1926).
200. 54 CONG. REC. 1742 (1917).
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achieved. The description of the purposes of the United Nations con-
tained in Article I of the Charter calls on United Nations members
"to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... -201
Many developments since the adoption of the United Nations
Charter have affected the right of self-determination. Unfortunately,
they have left much uncertainty over the current status of the concept
in international law. For example, although the principle is well-
established in international documents, it has not become a universal
part of the practice of states.202 With that uncertainty in mind, we
feel it is important to analyze developments since establishment of the
United Nations in the following frame of reference. The United Na-
tions Charter sets forth an ideal: a general, theoretical statement of
the right to self-determination. It was inevitable that it would take a
certain amount of time and experience to develop the manner in
which that principle would be implemented. The United Nations
Charter should be viewed as a general statement of the principle,
which was to be, and has been, followed up by more specific and de-
tailed standards to implement the principle. That process has in fact
been occurring in the thirty years since the United Nations Charter
was signed.
Two of the most basic United Nations documents are the Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights °0 and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.20 Article 1 of each provides:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.
2. The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their nat-
ural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations aris-
ing out of international economic co-operation, based upon the prin-
ciple of mutual benefit and international law. In no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistance.
3. The State Parties to the Covenant, including those having respon-
sibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing territories, shall
201. Article 55 of the Charter provides in part: "With a view of the creation
of the conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples .... "
202. Carey, Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era: The Case of Quebec,
I A.S.I.L.S. L.J. 37 (1977).
203. [1966] U.N.Y.B. 419.
204. Id. at 423.
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promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations.
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted three decla-
rations which stress the importance of the right to self-determination.
In the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples,2 05 the Assembly declared:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impedi-
ment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their political, economic, social and cultural development.
In the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic
Affairs and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty,20 the
Assembly affirmed:
All states shall respect the right of self-determination and inde-
pendence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any
foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall contribute to the
complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all
its forms and manifestations.
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations2Or proclaimed:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference,
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and
to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the re-
205. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
206. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
207. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082
(1970) (emphasis added).
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sponsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implemen-
tation of the principle in order:
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among
States; and
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to
the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle,
as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary
to the Charter.
Several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly over
the years have reaffirmed the importance of the principle of self-deter-
mination and encouraged various means for bringing about protec-
tion of that right. In 1950, the General Assembly "call[ed] upon the
ECOSOC -to request the Commission on Human Rights to study ways
and means which would insure the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination .... ,,208 In more recent resolutions, the General Assem-
bly has reaffirmed the right of all peoples, particularly those of South-
ern Africa,209 to self-determination, freedom and independence, and the
legitimacy of their struggle to free themselves from colonial oppres-
sion,210 and has reaffirmed the inalienable right to self-determination,
freedom and independence of all peoples under control and foreign
domination and alien subjugation, in conformity with the Assembly's
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples.211 In 1977, the Assembly unanimously invited all states
to become parties to the Human Rights Covenants,212 recognized the
progress achieved in the elimination of colonialism and the realization
of the right of peoples to self-determination, and demanded "'the re-
lease of all individuals detained or imprisoned as a result of their
struggle against apartheid, racism, and discrimination, colonialism, ag-
gression, and foreign occupation and for self-determination independ-
208. G.A. Res. 421, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 42, 43, U.N. Doc. A/1620(1950).
209. G.A. Res. 3222, 29 U.N. GAO1, Supp. (No. 31) 84-85, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
210. G.A. Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A. Res. 32/14, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 133-34, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1977).
211. G.A. Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
212. G.A. Res. 32/66, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 139, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1977).
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ence, and social progress for their peoples." 213 The Assembly recognized
that racial discrimination, threats against national sovereignty, and the
refusal to recognize the fundamental right of self-determination con-
stitute "flagrant violations of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms of peoples as well as of individuals." 214 Thus, since its inception,
the United Nations has treated self-determination as an essential aspect
of human rights belonging to groups that qualify as "peoples," and not
merely to political entities that may have come to power by methods
that do not reflect the wishes of the people.
It is important to note that the United States has consistently
supported the principle of self-determination. President Woodrow
Wilson was one of the most outspoken advocates of the principle after
World War I. In 1947, the United States State Department asserted
that "[i]n the inter-war period, the United States Government con-
tinued its traditional support of self-determination and self-govern-
ment as well as non-discriminatory treatment in dependent terri-
tories." 21 5 On October 27, 1945, President Truman proclaimed "that
all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted
to choose their form of government by their own freely expressed
choice, without interference from any foreign source."210 The United
States has even recognized that Native Americans are entitled to ex-
ercise that essential right. In a message to Congress in 1970, former
President Nixon stated: "The time has come to break decisively with
the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the In-
dian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions."21 7
On January 4, 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act,218 which purports to support and en-
courage the tribes' right to govern their own affairs and administer
their own programs and activities. In the statement of findings, Con-
gress found that "the Indian people will never surrender their desire
to control their relationships both among themselves and with non-
Indian governments, organizations, and persons." 219
213. G.A. Res. 32/122, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 145, U.N. Doe. A/32/45
(1977); G.A. Res. 32/121, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 144-45, U.N. Doe. A/32/45
(1977).
214. G.A. Res. 32/130, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 150, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1977).
215. U.S. DEP'T oF STATE, THE UNITED STATES AND NoN-SELF-GOVERNING TER-
iaTORiS 4-5 (1947).
216. Id.
217. 116 CONG. REc. 23131 (1970).
218. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450(a)-(n) (1976).
219. Id. § 450(a) (2).
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B. Current Status of the Principles of Self-Determination
1. Who has the right to self-determination? The United Nations
Charter and other international documents refer to "self-determina-
tion of peoples" and sometimes to "self-determination of all peoples."
Although the definition of "people" for the purpose of the principle
of self-determination has not been extensively analyzed, there are sev-
eral very specific descriptions of the elements of the definition. Con-
temporary authority most often cited is the 1970 Greco-Bulgarian case
decided by the International Court of Justice. A people was defined
as:
A group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a
race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by
the identity of race, religion, language and tradition in a sentiment
of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining
their form of worship, insuring the instruction and upbringing of
their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their
race and rendering mutual assistance to each other.220
The International Commission of Jurists, a nongovernmental organi-
zation with consultative status in the United Nations, has proposed
the following criteria for defining a people: (1) a common history;
(2) racial or ethnic ties; (3) cultural or linguistic ties; (4) religious
or ideological ties; (5) a common territory or geographical loca-
tion; (6) a common economic base; and (7) a sufficient number of
people.2 2 1
2. Elements of the right to self-determination. A more detailed con-
sideration of the elements of the principle of self-determination is
found in a recent commentary:
A people is entitled to be free:
1. From internal or external domination;
2. From discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political
conviction;
3. To pursue their own economic, social and cultural development;
4. To enjoy fundamental human rights and equal treatment;
5. To form a government of their own choosing.222
The exercise of these interrelated freedoms combines to form the
foundation of self-determination.
220. [1970] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 17, at 21.
221. SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS
iN EAST PAKISTAN 70 (Geneva 1972).
222. U. UMOZURiKE, supra note 198, at 188.
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3. Obstacles to the principle of self-determination. There are two
principles of international law -that some states and commentators
have used as justifications for denying the right to self-determination:
the principle of territorial integrity, and limitation of the concept to
overseas colonies. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter pre-
cludes the United Nations from intervening in matters which are "es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." That provi-
sion, however, does not preclude consideration of a people's status
simply because a nation claims jurisdiction over that group of people.
Article 2(7) makes an exception for matters that, under Chapter VII
of the Charter, are considered a threat to international peace. The
international community has determined that the denial of the right
to self-determination is just such a threat to international peace and
stability. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples 2 states:
The General Assembly,
Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or
impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which con-
stitute a serious threat to world peace,
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents
the development of international economic cooperation, impedes the
social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and
militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,
Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irre-
versible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put
to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination as-
sociated therewith,
Declares that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domina-
tion and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental hu-
man rights, is contrary to the Charter of the f~nited Nations and
is an impediment to the promotion of World Peace and co-op-
eration.
The Restatement provides that "[a] violation of international law
gives to a state or international organization adversly affected, a claim
223. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, supra note 205.
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that may be adjudicated in appropriate forum .... "224 Therefore,
Native American nations have a right to present violations of inter-
national law discussed in Part I of this article to the appropriate in-
ternational forums.
Some commentators have stated that the right to self-determina-
tion does not include 'the right to secede from an established state.225
Those who do adhere to the principle, however, recognize that it ap-
plies only to people who have originally made a choice to be included
in a state. Once they have made -that initial selection, the nation is
defined and not even the right to self-determination justifies secession
from the political entity.228 Therefore, Article 2(7) cannot be used to
perpetuate control or jurisdiction by a state over a people that has
not chosen to be included within 'that state. One commentator has
proposed a resolution of the apparent conflict by suggesting a test of
reasonableness:
In short, to approximate a public order of human dignity, the test
of reasonableness is the determining factor in deciding how to re-
spond to the claim of self-determination. The total context of such
claim must be considered: the potential effects of the grant or de-
nial of self-determination upon the sub-group, incumbent group,
neighboring regions, and the world community.2 7
A critical issue in assessing the lawfulness of a claimant
group's demands, consequently, is the degree to which their value de-
mands are compatible with global community demands and poli-
cies.228
The same commentator analyzed paragraph 6 of the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.229
He observed -that the drafters of the Declaration did not mean that
self-determination would be unavailable to groups within established
bodies politic. Paragraph 6 merely condemned intervention by third
parties.2 30 Finally, we note -that President Garter, in a speech to the
224. RESTATEM ENT, supra note 51, § 3.
225. See Carey, supra note 202, at 53; Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 Am. J.
INT'L L. 459, 465 (1971).
226. Carey, supra note 202, at 50, 62 n.90.
227. Suzuki, Self-Determination and the World Public Order: Community Response
to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779, 784 (1976).
228. Id. at 814.
229. Paragraph 6 provides: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total destruction
of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
230. Suzuki, supra note 227, at 843.
1978]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
United Nations General Assembly on March 17, 1977, stated that "no
nation can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own
business."
Another obstacle to the right of self-determination is the restric-
tion that has been placed on it by some states and commentators who
would apply it only to overseas colonies. However, the drafters of the
various United Nations documents which bear on the subject did not
intend that the principle would be so limited: "A colony is a colony,
whether it is the product of overseas expansion or 'the product of over-
land expansion."23' In the plenary session which considered the mat-
ter, several members of the General Assembly stated that the principle
of self-determination is not restricted to peoples living in colonies but
extends to all peoples. 2 The Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples condemns all forms of
colonialization.23B
C. Self-Determination and Native Americans
1. Native American nations are "peoples" for the purpose of the
right to self-determination. Each native nation, either individually or
as part of a larger group, is part of an identifiable race, and has a re-
ligion, language and set of traditions and customs which has united
it through the centuries and continues to unite it today. It seeks to
maintain, and is maintaining, its cultural and religious unity. It passes
on through its generations a reverence for the group's history, the im-
portance of its land base and connection with the earth and all living
,things. It maintains its economic system and its ways of making a live-
lihood. In short, it fulfills the requirements of -the definitions given
by the International Court of Justice and the International Commis-
sion of Jurists for a "people".2
2. Exercise of the right to self-determination. Earlier sections of
this article have demonstrated that Native Americans are both capable
and desirous of choosing their own forms of government, of provid-
ing for their own well-being and protection, of developing and main-
taining their economic, social and cultural institutions. However, the
United States government enforces laws and policies which effectively
231. U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Plenary 1145, A/P.V. 935 (1966), cited in Nawaz,The Meaning and Range of the Principle of Self-Determination, 1965 DuxE L. J. 82.
232. Id. at 93.
233. Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, supra note 211.
234. See text accompanying notes 220-21 supra.
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interfere with their exercise of the right to self-determination. Native
Americans are not free from internal and external domination. Under
the plenary power doctrine,235 the United States claims, and in many
cases enforces, the right to pass laws which govern Indian territory
whether the Indians agree with the law or not. The United States treats
Indians as citizens of the United States, again without the consent of
the Indians.23 6 Indian tribes are subjected to internal domination when
intelligence agencies of the United States, such as the F.B.I. and C.I.A.,
place informers and agents within the Indian tribes and organizations
for the purpose of disrupting them and providing information to the
United States Government.23 7 Also, Native Americans are subjected to
racial discrimination.238
Native nations and people do in fact pursue their own economic,
social and cultural development. Although the United States pretends
to respect those institutions, it actually places both de jure and de facto
restrictions on natives' freedom of choice.23 Earlier parts of 'this article
have noted some of the attacks which the United States and non-Indian
society in general have carried against native social and cultural insti-
tutions and practices.2 40
Even though the United States unilaterally forced citizenship on
Indian people, it nevertheless denies Indians fundamental human
rights, equal application of the laws, and equal participation in the
economic and political systems of this country.241 Finally, the United
States enforces significant limitations on the discretion of Indian peo-
ple to choose and implement their own form of government. Federal
statutes create explicit requirements for the structure of tribal govern-
235. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
236. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
237. See Blue Dove of the F.B.I., Akwesasne Notes, vol. 8, no. 3, at 12 (1976);
F.B.I. and Indians, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 6, no. 5, at 31 (1975); Portrait of an In-
former, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 5 no. 3, at 47 (1973).
238. See UNITED STATES COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE NAVAJO NATION: AN
AMERICAN COLONY (1975); NEW MExico ADVISORY COMM. TO THE UNITED STATES
COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FARMINGTON REPORT: A CONFLICT OF CULTURES
(1975); There are Thousands of Political Prisoners in the United States, Akwesasne
Notes, vol. 10, no. 3, at 18 (1978); "If You're Indian, You're In" Has Different Mean-
ing in Oklahoma, Akwesasne Notes, vol. 7, no. 2, at 22 (1975).
239. For example, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has considerable control over the
development of resources on Indian Reservations. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 391-415 (1976); 25
C.F.R. §§ 120-184 (1978).
240. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 119, 138-41 supra.
241. OFFICE OF PROGRAM RESEARCH, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE LEGAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WASHINGTON STATE AND ITS RESERVATION BASED INDIAN
TRmEs 12 (1972).
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ments:242 some require that native governments perform particular ac-
tivities, while others contain prohibitions.m Federal laws that are ap-
plied to Indian people without their consent are an indirect method
of taking away from Indians the power to choose their own government.
In short, the United States and non-Indian society place limita-
tions on native self-determination in each of the five elements that con-
stitute the right of self-determination. That the United States is, by
means of superior force of arms, infringing on that right in violation
of international law, does not change the conclusion that native people
have the right.
3. Territorial integrity and the limitation of self-determination to
overseas colonies. As discussed previously, these two obstacles have
blocked the institution of self-determination. Section II(b) (3) de-
scribed some general responses to attempts to limit the principle. Those
responses are particularly applicable to Native Americans; the attempts
at limitation should not prevent Native Americans from exercising the
right of self-determination.
The United States' control over Native Americans is a striking
example of authority imposed in violation of international law.244 Even
if certain native nations did elect to separate themselves completely
from the United States, they would be separating themselves from a
state which has improperly and illegitimately forced Indians into its
political boundaries. Further, even if the right to self-determination
is not interpreted as including the right to secede, the "one time only"
exception to that principle24 5 leaves natives free to make their choice
since they have never voluntarily consented to be assimilated into the
international state known as 'the United States. 4 Finally, not even the
United States argues that Indian tribes are a fully integral part of the
United States. Supreme Court decisions repeatedly refer to Indian
tribes as semi-sovereign states, recognizing at least a degree of their in-
dependence, and therefore debunking the theory that Indians are
merely a part of the United States.2 7
242. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477, 1302, 1303 (1976).
243. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 13, 1152, 1154, 1161 (1976). See also United States
v. Bums, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 364 F. Supp.
192 (D. Mon. 1973); AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT OF TASK
FORCE ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT (1976); AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COIMISSION,
REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION (1976).
244. See text accompanying notes 101-94 supra.
245. See text accompanying note 228 supra.
246. See text accompanying notes 157-75 supra.
247. See Santa, Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Tribe, 434 U.S. 949 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 434 U.S. 816 (1978).
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The discussion above noted that the right to self-determination is
not intended to be limited to geographically separate colonies. Even
if 'the principle were so limited, however, it would still be applicable
to native nations. Tribes have their own separate land areas, 248 and
suffer under conditions that satisfy any definition of colonized people.249
III. SELF-DETERMINATION: SOVEREIGNTY OR ?
Sovereignty and self-determination represent two different cate-
gories of legal principles. Sovereignty is a substantive legal status that
defines one of the many types of states found in the international com-
munity. Self-determination is more in the nature of a procedural
mechanism which allows those groups of people who meet certain
qualifications to choose among the various international legal statuses,
of which sovereignty is one.
We suspect that when the analysis of sovereignty described in Part
I of this article is applied to each native nation in North America, it
will show that some Indian -tribes are entitled to full sovereignty and
independence, while others are entitled to something less than full and
complete sovereignty. An automatic mandate that every Indian tribe
assume full sovereign status, or any other status, would not fit the needs
of all tribes. There are a myriad of possibilities: Some might choose
full sovereign, independent status; some might choose confederation
with one or more other native nations; 250 some might choose alliance
with the United States, either individually or in confederation with
other native nations; some might choose to keep their current status;
some might choose termination of their tribal status and assimilation
into the United States; some might choose other options. Along a con-
tinuum that proceeds from fully dependent or subjugated states on one
end to fully sovereign and independent states on the other, Indian
tribes will undoubtedly choose a variety of points along 'that scale.
The right to self-determination is the procedural mechanism which
allows each Indian tribe meeting the definition of a "people" to make
its choice of where along that continuum it wishes to place itself; it
means the right to choose among ,the various political statuses and
means of economic, social and cultural development to which a people
is entitled. However, since some groups may qualify as "peoples" for
248. See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
249. See text accompanying notes 1-12 supra.
250. See I. BROWNLrE, supra note 2, at 79.
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the purpose of the right to self-determination, yet may not fill all the
requirements for fully sovereign status, we believe that the right to self-
determination must mean that the choices open to a people are limited
to those options for which it meets the substantive legal requirements.
That is, if a people is not, and does not fulfill the requirements for,
a sovereign state, the options from which it can choose in the exercise
of the right to self-determination do not include the choice of sover-
eign status.
In each of the first two parts of this article, there is a danger that
the discussion will leave contradictory impressions about Native Ameri-
cans' sovereign status and about their right to self-determination. Part
I pointed out that Native Americans are still entitled to their sovereign
status but that the United States has placed severe limitations on the
exercise of that sovereignty. That the United States is enforcing those
limitations does not change the fact -that natives are still entitled to
their full sovereign rights. If the limitations are being enforced in vio-
lation of international law, as Part I shows that they are, then those
limitations do not change the right of native peoples to sovereign status.
The same is true of the right to self-determination. Although the
United States prevents Indian tribes from exercising the right to self-
determination and making the free choices that constitute that right,
it is doing so in violation of international law. Those illegal actions
do not take away natives' rights to self-determination.
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